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A standard assumption in policy analyses and political debates is that classical liberal or libertarian views represent
a radical alternative to a progressive or egalitarian agenda.
In the political arena, classical liberalism and libertarianism often inform the policy agenda of centre-right and far-
right parties. They underpin laissez-faire policies and reject any redistributive action, including welfare state
provisions and progressive taxation. This is motivated by a fundamental belief in the value of personal autonomy
and protection from (unjustified) external interference, including from the state.
It is difficult to overestimate the philosophical and political relevance of classical liberalism and libertarianism.
President Trump’s proposal to repeal the “Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)”, for example, is clearly inspired by a
libertarian philosophical outlook whereby “No person should be required to buy insurance unless he or she wants to”
(Healthcare Reform to Make America Great Again ).
More generally, in the last four decades the political consensus, and the spectrum of policy proposals and outcomes,
has significantly moved in a less interventionist, more laissez faire direction. The centrality of classical liberal and
libertarian views has been such that the historical period after the end of the 1970s – following the election of
Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US – has come to be known as the “Neoliberal era”.
Yet the very coherence of the classical liberal and libertarian view of society, and its consistency with the
fundamental tenets of modern democracies, have been questioned. Thanks to the work of Nobel laureate Amartya
Sen, for example, it has long been known that classical liberalism and libertarianism may contradict some
fundamental democratic principles as they are inconsistent with the principle of unanimity (also known as the Pareto
Principle) – the idea that if everyone in society prefers a policy A to a policy B, then the former should be adopted.
In a new study, we have analysed the consistency of classical liberalism and libertarianism in the light of the
challenges that modern societies face, such as environmental problems and the allocation of resources between
generations. In particular, we have adopted the modern tools of economic analysis in order to provide rigorous
answers to the following questions:
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Can liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom provide consistent foundations for social choices?
And what are the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice and
economic policies?
To be precise, we study a property – formally, an axiom – capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, the harm
principle, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s classic book On Liberty (1859).
The basic idea of the harm principle is that: ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others… The only part of the conduct of
anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.’ (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Chapter I).
Formally, we translate this intuition as follows: suppose that society chooses policy A – say, a flat tax – over policy B
– say, a progressive tax. Suppose next that after this choice, but before the implementation of the policy, your
welfare decreases for reasons independent of the policy. Perhaps you have been unlucky and have broken your leg.
Or maybe you have been careless and your house has burnt down. Either way, nobody else but you is affected . In
this scenario we argue that, in a liberal perspective, if after the decrease in welfare you still prefer policy A (flat tax)
to policy B (progressive tax), then society should not switch to a progressive tax.
The principle captures the idea that an agent can veto society from switching choices after a negative change that
affects only her and nobody else. A switch in society’s choices against someone after she has incurred a welfare
loss would represent a punishment for her which does not yield any benefits to others. This would run directly
counter a liberal ethics.
The Harm Principle, as we formalise it, is intuitive and not particularly demanding. For example, it does not impose
the adoption of a flat tax in our example: it says that if a flat tax was chosen, then it should still be chosen in the
circumstances described. Although it does not outline the boundaries of a complete liberal theory of the state, the
Harm Principle does capture some of the core liberal intuitions, and in particular a liberal view of noninterference
whenever someone suffers a welfare loss and nobody else is affected. This mild and reasonable principle has some
rather startling implications.
We show that, unlike in Amartya Sen’s seminal contribution, classical liberal views of individual autonomy and
freedom – as embodied in the harm principle – can provide consistent foundations for collective evaluations, and
are consistent with the fundamental democratic principle of unanimity.
In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues,
including those related to intergenerational justice. This is a key policy area in the light of current debates on climate
change and carbon emissions, and a natural application of the harm principle, which embodies some important
aspects of the very idea of sustainability as defined in the United Nations’ Brundtland Report.
Yet, the harm principle has a surprising and counter-intuitive implication when coupled with the principle of unanimity
and a basic notion of fairness, known as the principle of Anonymity, – according to which policies should not be ad
hominem and be designed independently of individual identities.
We show that, together with Anonymity and the Pareto Principle, the Harm Principle leads straight to the adoption of
strongly egalitarian policies – more precisely, policies promoting the equality of welfare among all members of
society, as advocated by the American political philosopher John Rawls. In other words, contrary to the received
view, classical liberalism and libertarianism do not provide a radical alternative to egalitarianism: rather, this analysis
can be interpreted as showing that if one adopts a liberal view of non-interference (and the fundamental democratic
principle of unanimity), then one is forced to embrace egalitarian redistributive policies, including progressive
taxation and the welfare state.
2/4
Some important implications derive for both of the main contending approaches in political philosophy. Our result
can be read as suggesting that classical liberals and libertarians need to reconsider the philosophical foundations of
their political outlook: if they want to escape the egalitarian implications of our result – without rejecting the
fundamental democratic principle of unanimity – then they must reconsider the central role traditionally attributed to
John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle.
Alternatively, and perhaps more provocatively, our results can be seen as shedding new light on the normative
foundations of egalitarian principles and progressive politics. For a strong support for redistributive policies derives
from a combination of a belief in democratic procedures and a liberal principle of non-interference and individual
autonomy. So perhaps our work provides a rigorous, novel justification for the label `liberal egalitarianism’ usually
associated with modern approaches to progressive politics.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on the authors’ paper Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle, The Economic
Journal, November 2016
The post gives the views of its author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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